TAN Council Member Handbook

TAO Updates Council Member Resources
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Introduction

This document is designed to aid Telcoin Association TAN Council Members better understand their roles and responsibilities within the Telcoin Association governance structure.

The document is split into two sections:

  • Miner Councils Overview - Introduces council members to the broader Telcoin Association structure and the high level roles played by different participants within Telcoin Association’s governance system.
  • TAN Council Handbook - This section provides the knowledge required for TAN council members to succeed in their role.

A Note to Council Members

In accordance with TGIP1, following the conclusion of the inaugural elections, the Telcoin Association Miner Councils now form a communal governance system with a flat organizational structure. As such, there is no top down decision making process. This requires a high level of autonomy and accountability from the whole community, but particularly the council members. Each council member is a peer, including those who are members of the TAO. The Telcoin Association documentation is comprehensive, enabling all community members to reach the level of understanding of those who wrote it. We should all strive to become experts on the Telcoin Association and realise the full potential of this impactful opportunity.

At a high level, the role of the miner councils is:

  • To assist the broader community with the development of improvement proposals
  • To vote on Improvement proposals
  • To communicate with Telcoin Association miners

Each of these processes should serve to fulfill the purpose of Telcoin Association as presented in the Telcoin Association Constitution.

Miner Councils Overview

The Telcoin Association governance structure is presented in Figure 1. This shows the relationship between Miner Groups, Miner Councils and the Miner Assembly. We will consider each of these elements in turn, to provide a broad understanding of the Telcoin Association structure and relative roles of the participants.

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Figure 1: Telcoin Association Miner Councils

Miner Groups

Miners are the primary actors who produce Telcoin Platform services, earn TEL fees from consumers, extract TEL issuance from the system, and are empowered collectively with full power and control within Telcoin Platform governance. They are split into four groups: Stakers, Developers, Liquidity Miners and Validators. A brief summary of each group is given below.

Liquidity Miners

  • Role: Liquidity provision on TELx.
  • Description: Users who provide liquidity to TELx DeFi markets, stake their liquidity in TELx staking contracts, earn fees from trades, and harvest TEL issuance based on their share of staked liquidity.
  • Voting Power: Propose and vote based on their pro-rata share of staked liquidity on TELx.

Developers

  • Role: Mobile Application Development on TAN.
  • Description: GSMA members who stake TEL, develop mobile applications connecting users to the Telcoin Platform, earn transaction fees from their customers, and harvest TEL issuance based on user adoption of their apps.
  • Voting Power: Propose and vote based on their pro-rata share of TEL staked on TAN relative to other TAN Developers.

Stakers

  • Role: Platform adoption on TAN
  • Description: Telcoin mobile application users who stake TEL and invite their network to join the Platform. They earn a percentage of their referred users’ fees in TEL and harvest TEL issuance based on their network’s adoption of the Platform.
  • Voting Power: Propose and vote based on their pro-rata share of TEL staked on TAN by Telcoin Application users.

Validators

  • Role: Blockchain security on Telcoin Network.
  • Description: GSMA mobile network operators (MNOs) who stake TEL for proof-of-stake consensus (PoS), manage validator nodes, produce, and verify transaction blocks. They earn TEL when they secure blocks to the blockchain.
  • Voting Power: Initially represented by the TAO until a quorum of 10 Validators, propose and vote with others in their Miner Group based on their pro-rata share of TEL staked for PoS consensus on Telcoin Network.

More information on these groups can be found here.

The Miner Groups each select representatives to sit on Miner Councils. These Miner Councils are key policy-making bodies within the Telcoin Platform, responsible for setting the rules and overseeing the collective-choice processes that govern various domains. Councils are split into global, local, and special types. A summary of the Miner Councils is given below.

Miner Councils

Global Councils

The Platform and Treasury Councils are considered ‘global councils’ as they have authority over and duties towards platform-wide systems and policies.

Platform Council (8 members)
  • Role: Oversees platform-wide systems and policies.
  • Responsibilities: Manages platform-wide systems, social policies, TEL Treasury, token contract, governance infrastructure, and Telcoin Network in cooperation with the Treasury Council.
  • Telcoin Improvement Proposal (TIP): Accepts, develops, and votes on TIP proposals to determine system or platform-wide policies including administration, communication, information, conflict resolution, compliance, and other general-purpose policies and associated improvements.
    • Approval: 6/8
    • Quorum: 100%
    • Duration: 5 days
Treasury Council (4 members)
  • Role: Shares authority over the TEL Treasury and token, governance infrastructure, and Telcoin Network
  • Responsibilities: Votes on proposals related to the TEL Treasury, governance infrastructure, and Telcoin Network.
  • TEL Improvement Proposal (TELIP): Accepts develops, votes, and submits TELIP proposals to the Treasury Council to determine rules for the allocation, distribution of the TEL Treasury, the TEL token and redemption contracts, governance infrastructure, the Telcoin Association Constitution, and Telcoin Network rules and system improvements after the network goes live with 10 authorised Validators.
  1. Platform Council votes
  • Approval: 6/8
  • Quorum: 100%
  • Duration: 5 days
  1. Treasury Council votes
  • Approval: 4/4
  • Quorum: 100%
  • Duration: 3 days

Local Councils

The TAN and TELx Councils are considered ‘local councils’ as they have authority over and duties towards sub-systems and local policies.

TAN Council (6 members)
  • Role: Governs the Telcoin Application Network (TAN).
  • Responsibilities: Manages TAN operational rules, plans and finances infrastructure, allocates TEL issuance, and disseminates system information.
  • TAN Improvement Proposal (TANIP): Accepts, develops and votes on proposals to change or introduce new elements to the Telcoin Application Network, alter TAN harvesting rules, and is responsible for generally representing the interests of and informing their constituency in matters pertaining to TAN.
    • Approval: 5/6
    • Quorum: 100%
    • Duration: 5 days
TELx Council (6 members)
  • Role: Governs the TELx network.
  • Responsibilities: Oversees TELx operational rules, plans and finances infrastructure, allocates TEL issuance, and shares system information.
  • TELx Improvement Proposal (TELxIP): Accepts, develops and votes on proposals to change or introduce new elements to the TELx, to alterTELx harvesting rules, and is responsible for generally representing the interests of and informing their constituency in matters pertaining to TELx.
    • Approval: 5/6
    • Quorum: 100%
    • Duration: 5 days

Special-Purpose Council

The Compliance Council is a special-purpose, cross-jurisdictional Council with a specific set of duties and policy-making authority across different levels of governance.

Compliance Council (4 members)
  • Role: Manages compliance, legal matters, conflict resolution, and authorizations.
  • Responsibilities: Ensures compliance, resolves conflicts, and manages legal and organisational matters across jurisdictions.
  • Compliance Council Improvement Proposal (CCIP): Possesses veto authority over all proposals for any applicable legal or Association compliance, the authority to authorise prospective participants into positions, to develop conflict resolution and authorizations procedures.
    • Approval Rate: 3/4
    • Quorum: 75%
    • Duration: 72 hours to submit and veto an affirmed proposal.

Miner Assembly

The four Miner Groups may also submit and vote on the same Telcoin Governance System Improvement Proposal (TGIP), forming a Miner Assembly.

The Miner Assembly operates at the constitutional level of authority and can alter any aspect of the Telcoin Platform governance system. Examples of such alterations include:

  • Adding or removing a Miner Council.
  • Altering the number of Council members on an existing governing body.
  • Changing the decision-making rules for governing bodies from super-majority to unanimous.
  • Dissolving the Telcoin Association Operations UAB (TAO) and or Association.
  • Revoking the authority and property rights of one of the Miner Groups.

The Miner Assembly therefore possesses ultimate authority over the Telcoin Association governance system. This is symbolised by its position at the highest level of figure 1.

More information on the Miner Assembly can be found here.

TAN Council Handbook

The TAN Council is a local governance organization with authority over and duties towards Telcoin Application Network (TAN) operational rules, system health and social well-being.

The council accepts, develops and votes on TANIP proposals to change or introduce new elements to the Telcoin Application Network, alter TAN harvesting rules, and is responsible for generally representing the interests of and informing their constituency in matters pertaining to the Telcoin Application Network.

Proposals

The TAN Council’s responsibilities are carried out through TAN Improvement Proposals (TANIPs) which are described in detail below.

TAN Improvement Proposal (TANIP)

TANIP: Authority Rules

The TANIP process may be used by the TAN Council to approve and implement the following types of rules:

  • TAN Harvesting Rules: Determines who is allowed to harvest issuance; the timing, quantity, location and technology used to harvest issuance on TAN.

    • Example: A proposal to reduce inclusion issuance and increase adoption issuance for stakers.

  • TAN Provisioning and Development: Improvements that provide for the construction and maintenance of new and existing TAN components and facilities as determined by the TAN Council.

    • Example: A proposal to create a new staking contract that allocates issuance and coordinates with the TAO or another third party as stipulated in the proposal, to implement the upgrade.

  • TAN Communication and Information Rules: Proposals that add new or alter existing communication and information systems including the TAN section of the Telcoin Discord and the scheduling of periodic community discussions.

    • Example: A proposal to add a ‘gated channel’ on the TAN section of the Telcoin Discord, requiring users to verify their staked TEL balance in order to access the channel.

  • TAN Issuance Storage & Distribution Mechanisms: Proposals that alter the infrastructure used to store and distribute TEL issuance from the TAN Council safe.

    • Example: The TAN Council votes to use an automated smart contract system to distribute TEL to staking contracts periodically instead of via airdrop.

TANIP: Implementation and Communication Rules

See Improvement Proposals: Implementation and Communication Rules.

TANIP: Forbidden Actions

  • Violating Telcoin’s mission, vision, values, and code of general conduct.
  • Proposing something that involves others without their consent.

TANIP: Authors

  • TAN Forum: Any registered member of the Telcoin forum may submit a TANIP to the TANIP forum channel for review by the community
  • TAN Council: All TAN Council members holding a TAN NFT, TAN members or other designated authors as determined by the Miner Assembly may submit TANIP proposals to the TAN Council snapshot for voting.
  • Veto: All Compliance Council and Telcoin Association Operations UAB (TAO) members, using the CCIP process, may submit TANIP veto proposals to the Compliance Council snapshot at any point during the formal voting process and within 72 hours afterwards.

TANIP: Voters

  • TAN Council: All TAN Council members holding a TAN NFT may vote on a TANIP in the TAN Council snapshot.
  • Compliance Council: All Compliance Council members holding a CCNFT may vote to veto a TANIP proposal using the CCIP process.

TANIP: Implementers

  • TAN Council: Responsible for instructing, coordinating, or administering the implementation of new policies and procedures internally or with third-parties.
  • TAO: At the request of the TAN Council, enforces rules, maintains and alters existing components, assists with the coordination of third parties to construct new facilities, and documents the outcome of TANIP proposals on Telcoin.org.

TANIP: Process

  1. TANIP Forum Proposal: Forum members submit a proposal to TANIP channel on the Telcoin forum.

  2. Discussion: The proposal is discussed with the community in the Discord/ forum and during recurring Council meetings with the specific Miner Council’s members. This collaborative process incorporates input from various stakeholders, helping to develop a comprehensive and well-considered proposal.

  3. TAN Council Proposal: A TAN Council, TAO member, or other designated author on the TAN Council snapshot page decides to submit the proposal to the TAN Council Snapshot for voting.

  4. TAN Council Vote: The TAN Council must vote with 5/6 approval within 120 hours (5 days) from TAN Council snapshot proposal submission, or else the proposal will not pass.

  5. Approval Rate: 5/6

  6. Duration: 120 hours (5 days) If the proposal receives at least 5/6 approval within 5 days of submission, it is affirmed.

  7. Compliance Council Veto Proposal: At any point during the TANIP voting process and within 72 hours after it has been affirmed by the TAN Council, Compliance Council or TAO members may submit a veto proposal to the Compliance Council snapshot using the CCIP process.

  8. Compliance Council Vote: The Compliance Council must vote to veto the proposal within 72 hours after it is approved by the TAN Council, or else the proposal will be approved. .

  9. Approval (Veto) Rate: 3/4

  10. Duration: 72 hours (3 days)

  11. Implementation:

  12. Off-Chain: The TAN Council either implements the proposal itself or works with the TAO or other third parties to implement the update.

  13. TEL Transfers: TEL is transferred from the TAN Safe to the intended address as a result of the affirmation of the proposal.

  14. Documentation: The Proposal Author from the TAN Council coordinates with the TAO (or another administrator as determined by the TAN Council) to update Telcoin.org TANIP documentation.

TANIP: TAN Council Evaluation

See Improvement proposal evaluation.

TANIP: Outcomes

  • Proposal Affirmed: If the proposal is affirmed through the TANIP process, it will be implemented and documented according to the specification outlined in the proposal.
  • Proposal Rejected: If the proposal is rejected by the TAN Council, the dissenting members must provide a rationale as to (1) why it failed to meet their decision-making criteria and (2) constructive feedback to help modify the proposal to meet the criteria provided in the rationale.
  • Proposal Vetoed: If the proposal is vetoed by the Compliance Council, the dissenting members must provide a rationale as to (1) why it failed to meet their decision-making criteria and (2) constructive feedback to help modify the proposal to meet the criteria provided in the rationale.

Communication

Responsibilities

The Treasury Council must schedule and attend recurring meetings at least every two weeks to:

  • Provide updates to the community.
  • Interview and debate proposal authors.
  • Answer questions from the community related to their domain.

These meetings will take place in the ‘Recurring Miner Council Meetings’ channel on Discord and must be scheduled two weeks in advance.

More information can be found here.

  • Communication: All TAN Council Members are required to attend all recurring meetings, to keep their constituency and the broader Telcoin community apprised of all improvements to the system and flow of issuance, and changes to the operational-rules.
    • Recurring Meetings: Schedule recurring meetings at least every two weeks, set the agenda for each each meeting, and attend all TAN Council meetings, or else after missing more than one meeting the Compliance Council may instruct the TAO to revoke the absent member’s NFT and vote on behalf of their constituency until a replacement is found.
    • Proposal Updates: Proposal authors are required to (1) update the TAN community each time a TANIP proposal has been submitted to a Council for voting, (2) inform of the outcome of a TANIP vote after it has been voted on by a Council, (3) inform the community of the status and progress of proposals in the implementation phase including when it has been implemented.
  • Information-sharing: The TAN Council is required to provide for the construction and maintenance of data & analytics systems that deliver real time and historical data relevant to TAN, and must analyze and update the community periodically based on historical activities and outcomes.
    • Data Analytics Systems: The TAN Council is required to provide for the construction and maintenance of data analytics systems that deliver real time and historical data relevant to TAN.
    • Data Analysis & Updates: The TAN Council is required to provide updates to the community pertaining to the overall economic health of TAN as a production system.

These communication policies can also be changed by miner councils. Information on these processes is provided here.

Representation and Special Duties

Council Members are assigned duties based on the specialization of their constituency. These special duties are as follows, can be altered at any time by miner groups in constitutional choice processes [TRIP- The process used by Miner Groups to alter their Council Members’ special duties - beyond the scope of this document], and are in addition to, not a replacement for, duties required by each Council as a collective body.

Staker Representatives (2): Represent the interests of, communicate with, and inform Stakers in on-going decision-making processes and day to day activities and outcomes. Stakers may vote to add/alter special duties and overall operational responsibilities required by their delegates at any time.

  • Specialization: Marketing and Education
  • Special Duties:
    • Marketing: Responsible for the research, design, and implementation of marketing initiatives, systems, and processes.
    • Education: Responsible for the research, design, and implementation of platform-wide education initiatives, systems, and processes.

Developer Representatives (2): Represent the interests of, communicate with, and inform Developers in on-going decision-making processes and day to day activities and outcomes. Developers may vote to add/alter special duties and overall operational responsibilities required by their delegates at any time.

  • Specialization: Incentives and Data
  • Special Duties:
    • Incentives: Responsible for designing and proposing new incentives policies and mechanisms to drive adoption.
    • Data: Responsible for analyzing, procuring and administering data analytics systems related to Telcoin mobile application economic activity.

Liquidity Miner Representative (1): Represent the interests of, communicate with, and inform Liquidity Miners in on-going decision-making processes and day to day activities and outcomes. Liquidity Miners may vote to add/alter special duties and overall operational responsibilities required by their delegates at any time.

  • Specialization: Communication
  • Special Duties: Responsible for sharing, documenting information related to TANIP proposals and administrating TAN Council social media and communication channels including Telcoin.org forum, documentation, and Discord.

Validator Representative (1): Represent the interests of, communicate with, and inform Validators and the TAO in on-going decision-making processes and day to day activities and outcomes.

  • Special Duties: Production coordination
  • Special Duties: Responsible for coordinating with the TAO and other third parties to implement TANIP proposals.
Channels

The following channels are used for TAN Council communication. Please stay up to date on all communication channels and answer any questions from the broader community when they arise.

Discord:

Forum:

  • TANIP forum - Forum for deliberation, feedback and contestation of TANIPs.

Snapshot:

Appendix

Improvement proposal evaluation

This section outlines key criteria to aid council members in assessing the effectiveness, feasibility, and alignment of proposals with the Telcoin Association’s mission, values, and legal framework. These criteria are designed to support comprehensive evaluation and ensure decisions contribute positively to the Association’s objectives and community interests.

  • Consistency with Shared Values: Is the proposed improvement consistent with the Mission, Vision, Values defined in Article 4.1 (a-c) of the Telcoin Association Constitution?
  • Feasibility: Technical, Economic, Financial, Legal, Political
    • Technical Feasibility: Can it be done? Is the potential course of action within the realm of possibilities given existing knowledge and technical capabilities?
    • Economic Feasibility: Is it worth doing? Will the expected benefits to be derived from any course of action exceed the expected costs including the cost of other opportunities foregone? If this criterion can not be met, a course of action will leave people worse off than better off.
    • Financial Feasibility: Can sufficient revenues be generated with reference to a proposed course of action to cover expenditures?
    • Legal Feasibility: Is a proposed program of action lawful? Is the proposed program within the legal competence of an entrepreneur to undertake on his own authority?
    • Political Feasibility: Can the appropriate decisions be sustained?
  • General Performance Indicators: How will the implementation of the proposal affect important variables within the ecosystem? Potential examples:
    • Liquidity: Liquidity provided to TELx markets, liquidity of TEL token markets
    • Number of Actors: Number of users, miners over time
    • Volume: Total volume transacted through the TELx marketplace and in each market over time.
    • Fees: Total fees paid to miners over time
    • Staked TEL: Total TEL staked by miners for use in production, harvesting and governance processes
  • Sustainability: Can the quantity of TEL issuance units available to be harvested by Miners according to TEL Harvesting Rules sustain at current levels over time?
    • Definition and Importance
      • Definition: Can the quantity of benefits produced by the system and extracted by appropriators sustain over time?
      • Importance: If the stock of benefits available to be extracted from a system are exhausted, the incentives to participate are proportionally reduced for future generations.
    • Indicators
      • Renewability Formula:
        • (Total TEL burned - Total TEL issued)/time
        • Does the Improvement Proposal affect TEL burn and issuance rates?
  • Economic Efficiency: How economically efficient is the proposed improvement as measured by the magnitude of the change in the flow of net benefits associated with an allocation or reallocation of resources?
    • Definition and Importance
      • Definition: Measured by the magnitude of the change in the flow of net benefits associated with an allocation or reallocation of resources.
      • Importance: The concept of efficiency often plays a central role in studies estimating the benefits and costs or rates of return to investments that are often used to determine the economic feasibility or desirability of public policies. (E. Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 66)
    • Indicators
      • (Net Increase in Benefits over time - Net Increase in Costs over time)
        • E.g. (Total referral and transaction fees 3 months after proposal - total referral and transaction fees three months before proposal) - (Total issuance three months after proposal - total issuance three months before proposal)
  • Participation: To what extent are (1) the community of local miners and (2) the specific Council and its members participating in co-production and deliberation processes?
    • Definition and Importance
      • Definition: Measured by the number of actors and their level of involvement in associated processes.
      • Importance: Participation tends to increase legitimacy; co-production can be an especially effective form of participation.
    • Indicators: Local Miners and TELx Council
      • Local Miners: Co-production and deliberation
        • Co-Production: The number of Miners with staked TELx liquidity in Miner production processes,
        • Deliberation: The number of voters in council member selection processes as measured by quorum rates and the general participation of Miners in discussions related to specific improvement proposals.
      • TELx Council: Co-production and deliberation
        • Co-Production: The number of TELx Council Members with TELx liquidity staked in production processes on TELx (optional public disclosure).
        • Deliberation: The number of TELx Council members who vote on TELxIP proposal(s) as measured by quorum rates and the general participation by each TELx Council member in discussions with the community related to specific proposals.
  • Legitimacy: Do miners view the deliberation process undertaken by the Council related to a particular IP as legitimate?
    • Definition and Importance
      • Definition: Legitimacy as seen by participants in decision processes.
      • Importance: Lack of legitimacy as seen by participants may lead to conflict between actors and reduce participation rates.
    • Indicators
      • Miner Social: Intensity of preferences opposed to an IP as demonstrated on the forum proposal, in the discord, and other discussions.
      • Delegations: The number of liquid delegations proposals submitted by miners to replace Council Members in relation to specific IPs and the resulting outcomes.
      • Veto: The number of Veto proposals and the voting outcome by the Compliance Council in relation to an IP.
      • Miner Council: The date of a proposal submission, the level of deliberation undertaken between council members and with the community.
  • Proportional Equivalence: Are TEL harvesting rules suitable to Network conditions? Are the benefits obtained by miners proportional to the amount of inputs required in the form of labor, material, or money?
    • Definition and Importance
      • Definition: The rules-in-use allocate benefits proportional to inputs required.(Understanding Institutional Diversity, 262-3, E. Ostrom).
      • Importance: When the rules related to the distribution of benefits are made broadly consistent with the distribution of costs, participants are more willing to pitch in to keep a resource well-maintained and sustainable. Relating user inputs to the benefits they obtain is a crucial element of establishing a fair system. If some users get all the benefits and pay few of the costs, others are not willing to follow rules over time. Thus, fairness is a crucial attribute of the rules of robust systems. (Understanding Institutional Diversity, 263, E. Ostrom)
    • Indicators: Harvesting rules restricting time, place, technology and/or quantity of TEL units are related to local conditions.
      • Issuance Harvesting: Total issuance harvested < total fees
      • Fiscal Equivalence: Total costs to produce improvements < total fees
  • Accountability: Are the Council and its members accountable to Miner Groups concerning the policies and rules they choose?
    • Definition and Importance
      • Definition: When evaluating collective-choice or constitutional-choice levels, one can ask whether officials are accountable to citizens concerning the policies and rules chosen.
      • Importance: Without accountability, actors can engage in various opportunistic, strategic behaviors. Achieving accountability requires that information about the preferences of citizens be available to decision makers.
    • Indicators: The Council and its members must be accountable to Miners concerning the rules and improvements they implement.
      • Information-sharing: The community has numerous forums and ample time within deliberation processes to share their preferences with Council members.
      • Enforcement Authority: If the Council proposes to implement something the community of Miners disagrees with, Miners may submit liquid delegation proposals to replace representatives at any time.

Improvement Proposals: Implementation and Communication Rules

Implementation Rules

  • The Council can work within their organizations and externally with third parties such as the TAO and other firms to implement the proposal as outlined in the implementation section of the Improvement Proposal.

Documentation Rules

  • The proposal author is required to document the proposal in Telcoin.org by updating the forum post and adding the affirmed proposal to the relevant Improvement Proposal documentation section chronologically.

Communication Rules

  • The proposal author must share the link to the proposal to the Improvement Proposals updates section of the Telcoin Discord after submitting it, after it is affirmed or rejected by the Council, and after it is either vetoed or not by the Compliance Council.
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