Compliance Council Member Handbook

TAO Updates Council Member Resources
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Introduction

This document is designed to aid Telcoin Association Compliance Council Members better understand their roles and responsibilities within the Telcoin Association governance structure.

The document is split into two sections:

  • Miner Councils Overview - Introduces council members to the broader Telcoin Association structure and the high level roles played by different participants within Telcoin Association’s governance system.
  • Compliance Council Handbook - This section provides the knowledge required for Compliance Council Members to succeed in their role.

A Note to Council Members

In accordance with TGIP1, following the conclusion of the inaugural elections, the Telcoin Association Miner Councils now form a communal governance system with a flat organizational structure. As such, there is no top down decision making process. This requires a high level of autonomy and accountability from the whole community, but particularly the council members. Each council member is a peer, including those who are members of the TAO. The Telcoin Association documentation is comprehensive, enabling all community members to reach the level of understanding of those who wrote it. We should all strive to become experts on the Telcoin Association and realise the full potential of this impactful opportunity.

At a high level, the role of the miner councils is:

  • To assist the broader community with the development of improvement proposals
  • To vote on Improvement proposals
  • To communicate with Telcoin Association miners

Each of these processes should serve to fulfill the purpose of Telcoin Association as presented in the Telcoin Association Constitution.

Miner Councils Overview

The Telcoin Association governance structure is presented in Figure 1. This shows the relationship between Miner Groups, Miner Councils and the Miner Assembly. We will consider each of these elements in turn, to provide a broad understanding of the Telcoin Association structure and relative roles of the participants.

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Figure 1: Telcoin Association Miner Councils

Miner Groups

Miners are the primary actors who produce Telcoin Platform services, earn TEL fees from consumers, extract TEL issuance from the system, and are empowered collectively with full power and control within Telcoin Platform governance. They are split into four groups: Stakers, Developers, Liquidity Miners and Validators. A brief summary of each group is given below.

Liquidity Miners

  • Role: Liquidity provision on TELx.
  • Description: Users who provide liquidity to TELx DeFi markets, stake their liquidity in TELx staking contracts, earn fees from trades, and harvest TEL issuance based on their share of staked liquidity.
  • Voting Power: Propose and vote based on their pro-rata share of staked liquidity on TELx.

Developers

  • Role: Mobile Application Development on TAN.
  • Description: GSMA members who stake TEL, develop mobile applications connecting users to the Telcoin Platform, earn transaction fees from their customers, and harvest TEL issuance based on user adoption of their apps.
  • Voting Power: Propose and vote based on their pro-rata share of TEL staked on TAN relative to other TAN Developers.

Stakers

  • Role: Platform adoption on TAN
  • Description: Telcoin mobile application users who stake TEL and invite their network to join the Platform. They earn a percentage of their referred users’ fees in TEL and harvest TEL issuance based on their network’s adoption of the Platform.
  • Voting Power: Propose and vote based on their pro-rata share of TEL staked on TAN by Telcoin Application users.

Validators

  • Role: Blockchain security on Telcoin Network.
  • Description: GSMA mobile network operators (MNOs) who stake TEL for proof-of-stake consensus (PoS), manage validator nodes, produce, and verify transaction blocks. They earn TEL when they secure blocks to the blockchain.
  • Voting Power: Initially represented by the TAO until a quorum of 10 Validators, propose and vote with others in their Miner Group based on their pro-rata share of TEL staked for PoS consensus on Telcoin Network.

More information on these groups can be found here.

The Miner Groups each select representatives to sit on Miner Councils. These Miner Councils are key policy-making bodies within the Telcoin Platform, responsible for setting the rules and overseeing the collective-choice processes that govern various domains. Councils are split into global, local, and special types. A summary of the Miner Councils is given below.

Miner Councils

Global Councils

The Platform and Treasury Councils are considered ‘global councils’ as they have authority over and duties towards platform-wide systems and policies.

Platform Council (8 members)
  • Role: Oversees platform-wide systems and policies.
  • Responsibilities: Manages platform-wide systems, social policies, TEL Treasury, token contract, governance infrastructure, and Telcoin Network in cooperation with the Treasury Council.
  • Telcoin Improvement Proposal (TIP): Accepts, develops, and votes on TIP proposals to determine system or platform-wide policies including administration, communication, information, conflict resolution, compliance, and other general-purpose policies and associated improvements.
    • Approval: 6/8
    • Quorum: 100%
    • Duration: 5 days
Treasury Council (4 members)
  • Role: Shares authority over the TEL Treasury and token, governance infrastructure, and Telcoin Network
  • Responsibilities: Votes on proposals related to the TEL Treasury, governance infrastructure, and Telcoin Network.
  • TEL Improvement Proposal (TELIP): Accepts develops, votes, and submits TELIP proposals to the Treasury Council to determine rules for the allocation, distribution of the TEL Treasury, the TEL token and redemption contracts, governance infrastructure, the Telcoin Association Constitution, and Telcoin Network rules and system improvements after the network goes live with 10 authorised Validators.
  1. Platform Council votes
  • Approval: 6/8
  • Quorum: 100%
  • Duration: 5 days
  1. Treasury Council votes
  • Approval: 4/4
  • Quorum: 100%
  • Duration: 3 days

Local Councils

The TAN and TELx Councils are considered ‘local councils’ as they have authority over and duties towards sub-systems and local policies.

TAN Council (6 members)
  • Role: Governs the Telcoin Application Network (TAN).
  • Responsibilities: Manages TAN operational rules, plans and finances infrastructure, allocates TEL issuance, and disseminates system information.
  • TAN Improvement Proposal (TANIP): Accepts, develops and votes on proposals to change or introduce new elements to the Telcoin Application Network, alter TAN harvesting rules, and is responsible for generally representing the interests of and informing their constituency in matters pertaining to TAN.
    • Approval: 5/6
    • Quorum: 100%
    • Duration: 5 days
TELx Council (6 members)
  • Role: Governs the TELx network.
  • Responsibilities: Oversees TELx operational rules, plans and finances infrastructure, allocates TEL issuance, and shares system information.
  • TELx Improvement Proposal (TELxIP): Accepts, develops and votes on proposals to change or introduce new elements to the TELx, to alterTELx harvesting rules, and is responsible for generally representing the interests of and informing their constituency in matters pertaining to TELx.
    • Approval: 5/6
    • Quorum: 100%
    • Duration: 5 days

Special-Purpose Council

The Compliance Council is a special-purpose, cross-jurisdictional Council with a specific set of duties and policy-making authority across different levels of governance.

Compliance Council (4 members)
  • Role: Manages compliance, legal matters, conflict resolution, and authorizations.
  • Responsibilities: Ensures compliance, resolves conflicts, and manages legal and organisational matters across jurisdictions.
  • Compliance Council Improvement Proposal (CCIP): Possesses veto authority over all proposals for any applicable legal or Association compliance, the authority to authorise prospective participants into positions, to develop conflict resolution and authorizations procedures.
    • Approval Rate: 3/4
    • Quorum: 75%
    • Duration: 72 hours to submit and veto an affirmed proposal.

Miner Assembly

The four Miner Groups may also submit and vote on the same Telcoin Governance System Improvement Proposal (TGIP), forming a Miner Assembly.

The Miner Assembly operates at the constitutional level of authority and can alter any aspect of the Telcoin Platform governance system. Examples of such alterations include:

  • Adding or removing a Miner Council.
  • Altering the number of Council members on an existing governing body.
  • Changing the decision-making rules for governing bodies from super-majority to unanimous.
  • Dissolving the Telcoin Association Operations UAB (TAO) and or Association.
  • Revoking the authority and property rights of one of the Miner Groups.

The Miner Assembly therefore possesses ultimate authority over the Telcoin Association governance system. This is symbolised by its position at the highest level of figure 1.

More information on the Miner Assembly can be found here.

Compliance Council Handbook

The Compliance Council is a special-purpose, cross-jurisdictional body responsible for compliance, legal matters, conflict resolution, and actor authorizations.

The council works with other councils to ensure all proposals meet legal requirements, holds veto power over any proposal for compliance reasons, mediates disputes within or between ecosystem participants, represents the Telcoin Association in legal matters, and supports positive legislation for the Telcoin Platform.

The council has veto authority over all Miner Council proposals and is responsible for verifying and authorizing (or denying) the identity and status of prospective Developers, Validators, Council Members, and other administrative personnel.

Compliance Council Improvement Proposal (CCIP)

CCIP: Authority Rules

The CCIP process may be used by the Compliance Council for the following types of proposals.

  • Veto Proposals: The Compliance Council may veto any Miner Council proposals using the CCIP process at any point during the voting process and up to 72 hours after it has been approved by the relevant Miner Council(s).
    • Example: A CCIP proposal to veto a TELIP proposal that would distribute issuance from the TEL treasury beyond sustainable levels.
  • Authorizations: The Compliance Council may authorize Miners, Council Members, and operational contributors using the CCIP process.
    • Example: A proposal to authorize a new Validator.
  • Authorizations Processes: The Compliance Council may introduce and alter new and existing authorizations processes.
    • Example: A proposal to create a KYC/AML process to verify the identity of new Council Members.
  • Conflict-Resolution Processes: The Compliance Council may develop and refine conflict-resolution processes.
    • Example: A proposal to create a new conflict-resolution process using discord and google forms.

Each of these processes differs in its type of procedural requirements. These are each considered in detail in CCIP: Processes

CCIP: Implementation and Communication Rules

See Improvement Proposals: Implementation and Communication Rules.

CCIP: Forbidden Actions

  • Violating Telcoin’s mission, vision, values, and code of general conduct.
  • Proposing something that involves others without their consent.

CCIP: Authors

  • CCIP Forum Channel: Any registered member of the Telcoin forum may submit a CCIP to the CCIP forum channel for review and requests for comments.
  • Compliance Council Snapshot: All Compliance Council members holding a CCNFT, TAO members or other designated authors as determined by the Miner Assembly may submit CCIP proposals to the Compliance Council snapshot for voting.

CCIP: Voters

Compliance Council: All Compliance Council members holding a CCNFT may vote on a CCIP veto proposal.

CCIP: Implementers

  • Compliance Council: Responsible for instructing, coordinating, or administering the implementation of new policies and procedures internally or with third-parties.
  • TAO: At the request of the Compliance Council, enforces rules, maintains and alters existing components, assists with the coordination of third parties to construct new facilities, and documents the outcome of CCIP proposals on Telcoin.org.

CCIP: Functions

CCIP Functions: Veto

The Compliance Council may veto any Miner Council proposals using the CCIP process at any point during the voting process and up to 72 hours after it has been approved by the relevant Miner Council(s).

Veto: Process

The following process is used by the Compliance Council to veto Miner Council improvement proposals (e.g. a TIP, TELIP, TELxIP, or TANIP).

  1. CCIP Proposal: At any point during the IP process and up to 72 hours after the Miner Council IP is affirmed by the relevant Miner Councils, a Compliance Council or Telcoin Foundation member submits a proposal to veto the Improvement Proposal to the Compliance Council Snapshot.
  2. Compliance Council Vote: The Compliance Council must vote to veto the proposal within 72 hours after it is approved by the relevant Councils, or else the proposal will be approved. The Compliance Council members who vote to veto the proposal, must provide their rationale and feedback at the time of the vote.
  • Approval (Veto) Rate: 3/4
  • Quorum: 75%
  • Duration: 72 hours (3 days)
  1. Implementation: If the proposal is approved, the following actions take place
  2. Social: The relevant Councils either implement the improvement or works with the TAO or other third parties to implement the update.
  3. TEL Transfers: TEL is transferred from the relevant Council Safe to the intended address as a result of the affirmation of the proposal.
  4. Documentation: The Proposal Author from the relevant Council coordinates with the TAO to update Telcoin.org IP documentation.
Veto: Evaluative Criteria
  • Consistency with the Telcoin Association Constitution: Mission, Vision, Values
    • Does this proposal violate the purpose set out in the Telcoin Association constitution mission, vision, and values?
  • Feasibility Criteria: Legal, Political
    • Legal Feasibility: Is a proposed program of action lawful? Is the proposed program within the legal competence of an entrepreneur to undertake on his own authority?
    • Political Feasibility: Can the appropriate decisions be sustained?
  • Participation: General community participation across miner groups in deliberation process
  • Legitimacy: As seen by participants in decision processes
  • Accountability: Councils are held accountable to Miners concerning the policies and rules chosen.
  • Proportional Equivalence: The costs of the system should be less than or equal to the benefits derived from the system.
Veto: Outcomes
  • Proposal Affirmed: If the proposal is affirmed without a veto by the Compliance Council, it will be implemented and documented according to the specification outlined in the proposal.
  • Proposal Vetoed: If the proposal is vetoed by the Compliance Council, the dissenting members must provide a rationale as to (1) why it failed to meet their decision-making criteria and (2) constructive feedback to help the relevant council modify the proposal to meet the criteria provided in the rationale.
CCIP Functions: Authorizations

The Compliance Council may authorize ##(allow participants to enter positions of authority in the Telcoin Platform Governance System) Miners, Council Members, and operational contributors using the CCIP process. Authorization is the

Authorizations: Process

The following CCIP process is used by the Compliance Council to authorize new Miners(where applicable), Council Members, and operational contributors.

  1. Forum Proposal: The prospective participant submits an authorization proposal to the respective authorizations channel on the Telcoin Forum.

  2. Compliance Council Proposal: A Compliance Council or Telcoin Foundation member submits the authorizations proposal to the Compliance Council snapshot for voting.

  3. Compliance Council Vote: Within 72 hours of submission, the Compliance Council votes to either approve or reject the prospective participant.

  4. Approval Rate: 3/4

  5. Quorum Rate: 75%

  6. Duration: 72 hours

  7. Authorization(or rejection): The new participant is either approved or rejected.

  8. Documentation: The proposal author from the Compliance Council coordinates with the Foundation to update Telcoin.org authorizations documentation.

Authorizations: Evaluative Criteria
  • Consistency with the Telcoin Association Constitution: Mission, Vision, Values
    • Does this proposal violate the purpose set out in the Telcoin Association constitution mission, vision, and values?
  • Consistency with the Boundary Rules: Eligibility and Authorization Rules
    • Attributes: Is the prospective actor eligible to participate in the based on their natural or acquired characteristics?
    • Conditions: Has the prospective actor followed the proper processes to enter the position?
  • Participation: Net new Actors participating in roles as a result of authorization processes
  • Efficiency: In use of resources and time
  • Accountability: Councils are held accountable to Miners concerning the policies and rules chosen.
Authorizations: Outcomes
  • Proposal Affirmed: If the authorizations proposal is affirmed using the CCIP process, the new actor will be authorized according to their station.
  • Proposal Rejected: If the proposal is rejected by the Compliance Council, the dissenting members must provide a rationale as to (1) why it failed to meet their decision-making criteria and (2) constructive feedback to help modify the proposal to meet the criteria provided in the rationale.
CCIP Functions: Process Development

The CCIP can develop, alter and implement authorizations and conflict resolutions processes and systems.

Process Development: Process
  1. Forum Proposal: A forum member submits the CCIP proposal to the CCIP channel on the Telcoin Forum.
  2. Compliance Council Proposal: A Compliance Council or Telcoin Foundation member submits the CCIP proposal to the Compliance Council snapshot.
  3. Compliance Council Vote: Within 72 hours of submission, the Compliance Council votes to either approve or reject the proposal
  4. Implementation: If the proposal is approved, the Compliance Council implements on its own, with the Telcoin Foundation, or another party as outlined in the proposal.
  5. Documentation: The proposal author from the Compliance Council coordinates with the Foundation to update Telcoin.org documentation.
Process Development: Evaluative Criteria
  • Consistency with the Telcoin Association Constitution: Mission, Vision, Values
    • Does this proposal violate the purpose set out in the Telcoin Association constitution mission, vision, and values?
  • Feasibility Criteria: Technical, Economic, Financial, Legal, Political
    • Technical Feasibility: Can it be done? Is the potential course of action within the real of possibilities given existing knowledge and technical capabilities?
    • Economic Feasibility: Is it worth doing? Will the expected benefits to be derived from any course of action exceed the expected costs including the cost of other opportunities foregone? If this criterion can not be met, a course of action will leave people worse off than better off.
    • Financial Feasibility: Can sufficient revenues be generated with reference to a proposed course of action to cover expenditures?
    • Legal Feasibility: Is a proposed program of action lawful? Is the proposed program within the legal competence of an entrepreneur to undertake on his own authority?
    • Political Feasibility: Can the appropriate decisions be sustained?
  • Efficiency: In use of resources and time.
  • Participation: Processes should be low cost and accessible to all Miners
  • Accountability: Councils are held accountable to Miners concerning the policies and rules chosen.
  • Proportional Equivalence: The costs of the system should be less than or equal to the benefits derived from the system.
Process Development: Outcomes
  • Proposal Affirmed: If the proposal is affirmed through the CCIP process, it will be implemented and documented according to the specification outlined in the proposal.
  • Proposal Rejected: If the proposal is rejected by the Compliance Council, the dissenting members must provide a rationale as to (1) why it failed to meet their decision-making criteria and (2) constructive feedback to help modify the proposal to meet the criteria provided in the rationale.

Communication

Responsibilities

The Compliance Council must schedule and attend recurring meetings at least every two weeks to:

  • Provide updates to the community.
  • Interview and debate proposal authors.
  • Answer questions from the community related to their domain.

These meetings will take place in the ‘Recurring Miner Council Meetings’ channel on Discord and must be scheduled two weeks in advance.

More information can be found here.

The Compliance Council is also responsible for:

Representation and Special Duties

Council Members are assigned duties based on the specialization of their constituency. These special duties are as follows can be altered at any time by Miner Groups in constitutional-choice processes, and are in addition to, not a replacement for, duties required by each Council as a collective body.

  • Staker Representative (1): Represent the interests of, communicate with, and inform Stakers in on-going decision-making processes and day to day activities and outcomes. Stakers may vote to add/alter special duties and overall operational responsibilities required by their delegates at any time.
    • Required Attributes: Must be a juris doctorate with conflict resolution experience.
    • Specialization: Conflict resolution
    • Special Duties: Responsible for designing, proposing, and administering low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms between actors on the Platform.
  • Developer Representative (1): Represent the interests of, communicate with, and inform Developers in on-going decision-making processes and day to day activities and outcomes. Developers may vote to add/alter special duties and overall operational responsibilities required by their delegates at any time.
    • Required Attributes: Must be a juris doctorate with compliance experience.
    • Specialization: Compliance
    • Special Duties: Responsible for analyzing proposals based on compliance with laws and the articles and principles outlined in the Telcoin Association Constitution, and for designing, proposing, and implementing a Telcoin Association compliance regime.
  • Liquidity Miner Representative (1): Represent the interests of, communicate with, and inform Liquidity Miners in on-going decision-making processes and day to day activities and outcomes. Liquidity Miners may vote to add/alter special duties and overall operational responsibilities required by their delegates at any time.
    • Required Attributes: Must be a juris doctorate with corporate legal experience.
    • Specialization: Legal & Organizational
    • Special Duties: Responsible for developing legal structures in order to protect and ensure participants have recognition of rights to organize, limited liability protections, and the ability to pay taxes within existing legal frameworks
  • Validator Representative (1): Represent the interests of, communicate with, and inform Validators and the TAO in on-going decision-making processes and day to day activities and outcomes. Validators (TAO in the interim) may vote to add/alter special duties and overall operational responsibilities required by their delegates at any time.
    • Required Attributes: Must be a juris doctorate.
    • Specialization: Authorizations
    • Special Duties: Responsible for coordinating with the TAO, prospective miners, producers, and Council Members to facilitate the authorization process for new participants to take positions on the Platform.

These communication policies can also be changed by miner councils. Information on these processes is provided here.

Channels

The following channels are used for Compliance Council communication. Please stay up to date on all communication channels and answer any questions from the broader community when they arise.

Discord:

Forum:

Snapshot:

Appendix

Improvement Proposals: Implementation and Communication Rules

Implementation Rules

  • The Council can work within their organizations and externally with third parties such as the TAO and other firms to implement the proposal as outlined in the implementation section of the Improvement Proposal.

Documentation Rules

  • The proposal author is required to document the proposal in Telcoin.org by updating the forum post and adding the affirmed proposal to the relevant Improvement Proposal documentation section chronologically.

Communication Rules

  • The proposal author must share the link to the proposal to the Improvement Proposals updates section of the Telcoin Discord after submitting it, after it is affirmed or rejected by the Council, and after it is either vetoed or not by the Compliance Council.