TGIP: Council Member Term Limits

Council Proposals TGIP
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Summary

This TGIP proposes limiting Council Members to X consecutive terms on the same Miner Council (proposed: 3), followed by Y terms out before they may stand for that council again (proposed: 1).

The parameters are set out below in the specification but they are open for discussion. The aim is to reach settings the community supports before any vote.

Background

The current rules set a 12 month term but no limit on how many terms a council member can serve.

  • Annual elections. All four Miner Groups (Stakers, Liquidity Miners, Developers, Validators) elect all Council Members every 12 months.
  • Five councils. Platform, Treasury, TAN, TELx and Compliance, with seats allocated to each Miner Group.
  • Mid-term replacement. Miner Groups can replace a Council Member at any time outside the election window through a Liquid Delegation.
  • Unfilled seats. If a Miner Group fails to elect a member, or turnout falls below the 20% quorum, the TAO substitute votes for that seat until someone is elected.
  • No term limits. Neither the Miner Councils documentation nor the selection rules restrict re-election.

Two elections have been held as of today: the inaugural election in September 2024 and the second in November 2025.

Motivation

Possible benefits of introducing term limits:

  • Fresh participation. Guaranteed turnover could give new community members a realistic route onto councils and widen the candidate pool.
  • Less concentration of influence. Council Members hold governance NFTs that control platform, treasury and compliance decisions. Rotation would limit how long one person holds that influence.
  • Timing. Setting a rule early, before anyone has served long tenures, avoids it ever looking like it is aimed at a particular person.
  • Maturity signalling. As Telcoin Network moves to mainnet and works with telco operators and regulators, clear tenure rules may match the governance standards those partners expect.
  • Knowledge spread. Moving experienced members between councils may spread understanding across the whole ecosystem.

Concerns to weigh

Possible drawbacks, which the parameters below try to address:

  • Loss of expertise. Good members would have to step away just as they become most effective.
  • Small candidate pools. Some seats already attract few candidates. A limit could leave seats unfilled and hand more votes to the TAO as substitute voter.
  • Voters already decide. Members stand for election every year, so miners can already vote out anyone they don’t want.
  • Liquid Delegation exists. Miner Groups can replace a member mid-term if they are unhappy.
  • Too early. With only two elections held, there may not yet be enough evidence that entrenchment is a real problem.

Specification

The following rules would be added to the Council Member Selection Rules. Each parameter shows the proposed value, with alternatives open for discussion.

  1. Term limit. A member may serve no more than X consecutive terms on the same council.
    • Proposed: 3 terms (3 years)
    • Alternatives: 2, 4 or 5 terms
  2. Cooling-off. After reaching the limit, a member sits out Y terms before standing for that council again.
    • Proposed: 1 term (1 year)
    • Alternatives: 2 terms, or a permanent lifetime cap
  3. Scope. Whether the limit applies per council or across all councils.
    • Proposed: per council
    • Alternative: across all councils
  4. Partial terms. A term counts if the seat was held for more than Z months of it, including seats gained through Liquid Delegation.
    • Proposed: 6 months
    • Alternatives: any length, or full terms only
  5. Vacancy safeguard. If no eligible candidate stands, a ‘termed-out’ member may stand for one further term.
    • Proposed: included
    • Alternative: excluded
  6. Transition. Which terms count towards the limit.
    • Proposed: first applied at the 2027 election
    • Alternative: previous 2 election terms counted towards the limit

In addition, the TAO would publish each candidate’s consecutive term count on each council alongside the candidate list at every election.

Election timing, quorum, voting rules, Liquid Delegation and KYC requirements are not changed by this proposal.

Implementation and approval route

This proposal is a TGIP because it changes representative selection rules, which the TGIP Rules cover. A TRIP wouldn’t work because each Miner Group votes on its own TRIPs and could only limit its own council seats (TRIP Rules).

  1. Forum discussion. Community feedback on the above parameters, after which the proposal is updated with the final values.
  2. Miner Group votes. Each Miner Group votes on the same proposal over 7 days. An 80% approval with a 20% quorum is needed.
  3. Documentation. If all groups approve, the author works with the TAO to update the Council Member Selection Rules documentation on telcoin.org.
  4. First use. Term counts are published for information at the next election, and the limit applies from the election set in the Transition parameter.

No budget is requested. The TAO’s added work is limited to tracking and publishing term counts each election.

Feedback sought

Views on any of these would help set the final values.

  1. Do you support introducing term limits at all?
  2. Is X = 3 consecutive terms right, or would you prefer 2, 4 or 5?
  3. Is Y = 1 term out long enough before standing again?
  4. Should the limit apply per council or across all councils?
  5. Should the term limit start at 2027 elections or backdate?

Thanks for reading.
Coops

1 Like
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Interesting idea and if we were running a full ship I would support this…but many councils have unfilled seats, have been for a long time, plus some of the existing members are absent more than they are present. Also, especially with Telx, there is a lot of complicated stuff going on…and to lose any effective member, who has learnt the ropes seems counter productive. So taking all that on balance, Im not sure the pros outweigh the cons imho

3 Likes
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At a pivotal time in the project with v3 upgrade, main net launch, and telx pool migrations, this proposal falls a little tone deaf for me. I understand the conception, but we should be focused on filling seats, not limiting them.

We should be focused on working with our devs, business partners and MNOs to fill seats and encouraging qualified candidates to apply, not building term limits that hamper progress with no real benefit.

I do not agree with this proposal and would encourage it to be tabled for later dates when the network is more mature.

1 Like
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Thanks Coops, but I don’t support this.

We already have accountability. Members face re-election every year. Term limits only overrule voters who want to keep someone.

Forcing out members who are doing well also leaves a gap and a new learning curve for someone else. We want good people staying as long as they perform and voters back them.

Some seats already struggle for candidates, so more vacancies would just hand more votes to the TAO as substitute. With only a few elections held, there’s no problem here to fix, and this adds complexity to a setup that’s already hard to follow.

I’d leave the rules as they are. If anything, I’d rather we look at simplifying the council structure than add more rules to it.

3 Likes
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I’m not against term limits at all, I just think it probably makes more sense later on when the councils are consistently filled. As more MNOs and developers get involved, some of them may dedicate or even hire people specifically to fill these governance roles. If you tell them that person can only serve for a short window no matter how effective they are, you could actually remove some of the incentive to invest in that expertise.

I’d rather see Telcoin wait until the councils are fully staffed and we have a few more election cycles behind us, then revisit term limits with something more flexible like 4 terms, a vacancy exemption, and maybe different rules for specialized seats. Put the guardrails in place once the system is mature enough to support them.

2 Likes