As a long-term spot holder(millions) who has backed Telcoin since 2018, I am writing to propose a constructive topic for discussion at an upcoming Council meeting. My goal is not to target or remove any current Council members, but rather to introduce a structural evolution that elevates governance standards.
Currently, multiple elected Miner Council members use community channels to share personal referral codes and communications regarding the project. While the network encourages referral marketing, having elected officials do this in shared spaces introduces several structural friction points, including Online Communications clutter, perceived Value Extraction from the existing user base, and potential Governance Capture regarding platform decisions.
To address this constructively, I would like to request that the Council formally debate the following framework and put it to a community vote:
Establish an Officer Code of Conduct: Define boundaries for where and how active Council members can promote personal referral networks and protect official communication hubs.
Implement Disinterested Voting (True Decentralization): Because this policy directly affects the personal revenue streams of Council members, the Council should recuse their own staking power from the Snapshot vote. The final decision should be voted on strictly by the community, without the voting weight of the Council itself.
Introducing a mechanism where the community alone votes on rules governing its leaders would mark a massive milestone for Telcoin’s decentralized maturity. It proves to external institutional partners that our governance structure is balanced, ethical, and built on true community sovereignty.
Thank you for your open-minded leadership and for considering this item for the next Council agenda.
Sincerely,
Henk Selier
PS: I was thrown out of the Telcoin telegram group for proposing this, where some council members are active. A really bad sign if we cannot debate or ask questions thus this proposal, because it is hurting the project and our investments. Let the commmunity decide. That is true decentralisation. Now I was silenced and treated like an enemy while thinking of the greater good.
Council members are community members first. If the Association creates a rewards program that is available to all participants, I don’t see why elected council members should be excluded from participating simply because they serve in a governance role.
In fact, I would argue the opposite. The people helping shape and oversee these programs should have firsthand experience using them. Participation creates alignment between council members and the broader community. If a program is beneficial to users, council members should be experiencing those same benefits and incentives alongside everyone else, and help encourage usage.
Creating a class of community members who are expected to volunteer their time, contribute to governance, and simultaneously be excluded from programs available to everyone else could actually discourage qualified people from serving.
The Telcoin ecosystem has always been built on community involvement. Council members should be held to standards of transparency and ethics, but they should not be stripped of the ability to participate in the very ecosystem they are helping govern.
Equal access, transparent disclosure, and clear conflict of interest policies seem like a better solution than outright exclusion.
I appreciate anyone taking the time to think about governance and propose improvements. However, I do not support this proposal.
The premise appears to be built on a misunderstanding of what is actually taking place. Council members who participate in the referral program are sharing their links on personal X accounts and in channels where referrals are explicitly permitted. They are not using official Association accounts, governance announcements, or Council communications to solicit referrals.
Telcoin intentionally created a referral program to incentivize users to help grow the network. Council members are also users, stakers, miners, validators, and community participants. Simply participating in an incentive program that is available to everyone does not constitute “value extraction” or “governance capture.”
The proposal also sets a concerning precedent by suggesting that Council members should be stripped of their voting power on matters that may impact them financially. Nearly every governance decision affects someone economically. By that logic, validators should abstain from validator proposals, miners from mining proposals, stakers from staking proposals, and large holders from proposals that may increase the value of TEL. That is not decentralization; it is selectively disenfranchising participants based on their level of involvement.
If there is concern about referral links appearing in official Telcoin communication channels, that could be discussed as a narrowly tailored policy. But regulating what elected community representatives can post on their personal social media accounts while participating in the same program available to all users seems unnecessary and inconsistent with the open participation model Telcoin has embraced.
Finally, being removed from a private Telegram group does not demonstrate censorship or a flaw in Telcoin’s governance model. Private communities are free to moderate discussions as they see fit, and disagreements within those spaces should not automatically be elevated into protocol-level governance issues.
For these reasons, I do not believe this proposal addresses a genuine problem, and I would vote against it.
I’m just a retired compliance council member, but the underlying idea here seems to violate the association’s Constitution.
Participation in the Telcoin Association is predicated on participation in one of four groups: validators, developers, liquidity providers, and stakers. To suggest that a council member should not participate in staking, while we require staking to vote on the part of the council that represents stakers is a logical black hole.
This is like saying “App developers, such as Telcoin Holdings, shouldn’t advertise the products they have created to run on the Telcoin network,” or “MNOs should not encourage anyone to use the network.”
The goal of the association, and the minimum requirement for participating in its councils, is to engage with the ecosystem.
Participation in the process is good, and it’s our goal. Therefore this proposal should be rejected immediately as incompatible with the spirit and letter of the association’s founding documents.
I have never seen any referal codes in formal Telcoin communcation channels. This person is referring to a Telegram chat group, “Power Holders,” which has never been owned or operated by the association.
Thanks all for considering.
I proposed this because I think it sends the wrong signal out to investors.
You can do in private life what you want, but people get fully blasted online and that sets a really negative tone in the community.
It is clear to me that the vote will be a no, but hope you reconsider the signals the community is giving you.
Again thank you for your time and insights.
Regards
Henk
But you went far further than that- “Because this policy directly affects the personal revenue streams of Council members, the Council should recuse their own stakeholder power from the Snapshot vote. The final decision should be voted on strictly by the community, without the voting weight of the Council itself.”
You seem to have no understanding of how our association works, or how authority to participate and vote comes from having a financial stake in the outcome. We get to vote because we are sharing the risk.
This is a “skin in the game” organization, and that is not a weakness or a flaw.
This shouldn’t even need to go to a vote. It goes against the charter.
I appreciate that the project’s technical architecture is separate from the centralized governance required for legal and regulatory compliance.
While this proposal was admittedly raised out of context, it was a deliberate move to draw attention to a vital issue.
My goal wasn’t just to stir the pot, but to seize an opportunity to advocate for better communication standards.
Streamlining and centralizing communication channels would significantly reduce the noise, provide clarity, and foster a healthier community.
As an investor, I have a personal stake in this ecosystem. While our roles differ, I deeply respect the foundation you have built; without your work, community participation wouldn’t be possible.
I hope you view these observations as constructive signals for the project’s future.